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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
PEYTON CHARLES MACDONALD,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
____________________________________)

NO. 48432-2020
KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR28-20-6272
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Peyton MacDonald pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance and driving
under the influence (DUI), the district court placed him on probation for four years, with
discretionary and mandatory jail time. Mr. MacDonald filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule
35”) motion, which the district court denied. Mr. MacDonald now appeals. He argues the district
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence and denying his Rule 35 motion.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In three separate cases, the State alleged Mr. MacDonald committed the crimes of felony
possession of a controlled substance, misdemeanor DUI, leaving the scene of an accident, and
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possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.10–11, 18, 19.) In the complaint, the State alleged the
controlled substance possessed by Mr. MacDonald was methamphetamine. (R., p.10.) The
district court consolidated the cases. (R., p.25.) Later, the State amended the complaint to change
controlled substance from methamphetamine to MDMA. (R., p.31.) The State filed an
information charging Mr. MacDonald with these four offenses. (R., pp.50–52.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. MacDonald plead guilty to felony possession of a
controlled substance and misdemeanor DUI. (Tr. p.10, Ls.11–18; R., p.53.) The State dismissed
the charges for leaving the scene and possession of paraphernalia (R., pp.57–58.)
Just before sentencing, the State moved to amend the felony possession of a controlled
substance charge because the State discovered that possession of MDMA was a misdemeanor,
not a felony. (R., pp.59–61.) At the sentencing hearing, the district court granted the motion. (See
Tr., p.16, L.12–p.19, L.8; R., p.71.) For the misdemeanor possession charge, the State
recommended a sentence of 365 days (335 days suspended, thirty days discretionary) and two
years of supervised probation. (Tr., p.20, Ls.3–8.) For the misdemeanor DUI charge, the State
recommend 180 days (150 suspended, thirty days discretionary) and two years of supervised
probation. (Tr., p.20, Ls.11–15) Mr. MacDonald requested 180 days for each offense (160 days
suspended, twenty days of discretionary) and two years of unsupervised probation. (Tr., p.20,
L.24–p.21, L.3.) Alternatively, Mr. MacDonald requested a withheld judgment and two years of
supervised probation with twenty days of discretionary time. (Tr., p.21, Ls.5–9.)
For misdemeanor possession, the district court sentenced Mr. MacDonald to 365 days,
suspended 330 days, with thirty days of discretionary jail time, and two years of probation.
(Tr., p.24, Ls.9–11.) For misdemeanor DUI, the district court sentenced Mr. MacDonald to 180
days, suspended 118 days, with thirty days of discretionary jail time and thirty days to be served
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immediately. (Tr., p.24, Ls.12–16.) The district court placed Mr. MacDonald on two years of
probation for this offense as well, to be served consecutively. (T., p.24, L.19–21; see also
R., p.67 (judgment).)
Mr. MacDonald filed a timely Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.74–77) In support of his motion,
Mr. MacDonald attached a letter from his supervisor at work, and he stated that his father,
brother, and supervisor would testify at a Rule 35 hearing. (R., pp.76, 80.) The district court
denied Mr. MacDonald’s Rule 35 motion and his request for a hearing. (R., pp.81–85.)
Mr. MacDonald timely appealed from both his judgment of conviction and the district court’s
denial of his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.67, 81, 86.)

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon
Mr. MacDonald for misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance and misdemeanor
DUI.

II.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. MacDonald’s Rule 35
motion.

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence Upon
Mr. MacDonald For Misdemeanor Possession Of A Controlled Substance And Misdemeanor
DUI
Mr. MacDonald argues that, given any view of the facts, his misdemeanor sentences are
excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the
public interest. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982).
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“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). In determining if an abuse of discretion occurred, appellate
review centers on whether the trial court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the
exercise of reason.” State v. Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 591 (2019).
Here, Mr. MacDonald’s sentences do not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § §372732(c)(3) (one-year maximum for misdemeanor possession); I.C. § 18-8005(1)(a) (six-month
maximum for misdemeanor DUI). Accordingly, to show the sentence imposed was unreasonable,
Mr. MacDonald “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive
under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
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Mr. MacDonald asserts that, given any view of the facts, his sentences were excessive in
light of the mitigating factors, and therefore the district court did not exercise reason because it
imposed an objectively unreasonable sentence.
There are several mitigating factors that support a lesser sentence. Mr. MacDonald was
at the time of sentencing. (Conf. Doc., p.25.) See State v. Dunnagan, 101
Idaho 125, 126 (1980) (youth as mitigating factor). Mr. MacDonald’s offenses were
misdemeanor offenses, and he has no prior criminal history. (Conf. Doc., p.6.) See State v.
Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 836 (2011) (lack of criminal history as mitigation). In addition,
Mr. MacDonald suffers from serious mental illness, including anxiety and depression (Conf.
Doc., p.8), and should receive treatment. (Conf. Doc., p.37.) I.C. See I.C. § 19-2523; see also
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834 (2011) (mental health as a sentencing consideration). He had
a very close relationship with his mother—he described her as his best friend—and he was
devastated when she passed away two years ago, resulting in a suicide attempt. (Conf. Doc., p.8).
He has tried to move forward with his life and had a steady job. (Conf. Doc., p.10.) See State v.
Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115, 118 (1955) (recognizing gainful employment as a mitigating factor). His
level of service inventory (“LSI”) score was sixteen, reflecting only a moderate risk of
reoffending. (Conf. Doc., p.6.) When discussing the offenses, Mr. MacDonald stated that he had
stopped taking his medication for a couple of weeks and it “really messed with [his] head.”
(Conf. Doc., p.12.) Mr. MacDonald took responsibility for his actions; he reported that he “feels
terrible” about his actions, “understands [he] messed up,” and was prepared to accept the
consequences. (Conf. Doc., pp.6, 13.) See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982)
(acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and regret are all factors in favor of mitigation).
Mr. MacDonald further recognized that he learned a valuable lesson. (Conf. Doc., p.6.)
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In summary, Mr. MacDonald contends proper consideration of the mitigating factors
warranted a more lenient sentence. Therefore, Mr. MacDonald submits the district court did not
exercise reason, and thus abused its discretion, by imposing an excessive sentence.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Mr. MacDonald’s Rule 35 Motion
If a sentence is within the statutory limits, then the request is a plea for leniency and is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2006). As noted
above, in determining if an abuse of discretion occurred, appellate review centers on whether the
trial court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.”
Bodenbach, 165 Idaho at 591. “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that
the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the
district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203.
In support of his Rule 35 motion, Mr. MacDonald submitted a letter from his supervisor
describing Mr. MacDonald’s strong work ethic. (R., p.80.) In particular, Mr. MacDonald’s
supervisor explained how moved quickly to a management position, taking only two months to
move through the ranks. (R., p.80.) Further, she stated Mr. MacDonald was a dependable,
diligent, and dedicated worker. (R., p.80.) The district court did not consider this additional
mitigating information. (R., p.83.) In fact, the district court stated that this information had no
relevance to Mr. MacDonald’s sentence. (R., p.83.) Idaho courts have recognized current
employment and a desire to advance in the company as an appropriate mitigating factor. See
Mitchell, 77 Idaho at 118; see also Shideler, 103 Idaho at 594–95 (employment and desire to
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advance within company were mitigating circumstances). Mr. MacDonald submits that, in light
of the additional information, the district court did not exercise reason by denying his Rule 35
motion. He contends that the district court’s denial of his Rule 35 motion was an abuse of
discretion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. MacDonald respectfully requests this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. In the alternative, he respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of
conviction and remand this case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. Alternatively,
he respectfully requests this Court reverse or vacate the district court’s order denying his Rule 35
motion and remand this case to the district court for a new Rule 35 motion hearing.
DATED this 16th day of February, 2021.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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